-Yury Vsevolodovich, I’d like to talk with you about the quite definite period in the history of this country which is however understudied and insufficiently known because even now it is drowning in propagandistic mist. I mean the very beginning of the 80’s , approximately from 81 to 85 when the USSR and the USA were preparing for nuclear war. In that very period KGB developed a large-scale operation of Nuclear Missile Assault (NMA) and just the same strategic plans of war had the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense and Pentagon. I happened to know that you were in the center of that war of nerves, political passions and military technologies.

- I would say: the world was always at the verge of war. We clashed with Americans face-to-face. First, in Korea then in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Afghanistan and a chance of overgrowth of these local conflicts into the global stand was always there. And you are right saying that the climax of it came to 1982- 1983. But preparations for possible war we started long before. In 1953 it became known that in the USA was undergoing development of ballistic intercontinental missiles which are able to deal a crushing nuclear strike onto the territory of the USSR underwent.. In the August of the same year seven Marshals of the Soviet Union, having discussed the situation with the chief of the Main Staff V. Sokolovsky, handed a secret note to the Central Committee of CPSU(Communistic Party of the Soviet Union) asking for permission to develop and initiate anti- missile defense system. The CC gave a green light. And prominent scientists took this job with Gregory Kisunko - the 35-year-old Doctor of Sciences as the head. To 1956 the experimental unit of AMDS (anti- missile defence system) of a so- called «A system» was ready. In the same year a range for Anti- Aircraft Forces near the Balhash lake was built. March 4th the first tests took place there. That day an antimissile rocket, made in Design Bureau of Peter Grushin, with its fragmentation warhead destroyed a warhead of a ballistic missile P-12, which was launched from the range in Kapustin Yar. Such kind of experiments the Americans will initiate only 23 years later. A successful experiment allowed us, in June 1961, to finish works at a draft of the AMDS(anti-missile system) A-35 to defend Moscow from possible nuclear strike. AMDS A-35 was to annihilate monoblock ballistic missiles of «Titan-2» amd «Minuteman-2» class, which appeared in the USA in 1963 and 1965. However, A-35 was added to this country’s armament only in 1977. That was because since the time we started our development , the Americans were intensively developing ground- and water- based ballistic missiles «Minuteman-3», «Polaris A3T» and «Poseidon C-3» with multiple warheads (from 3 to 10 nuclear blocks). A-35 was unable to destroy such missiles. It became clear in 1971 and in the same year D. F. Ustinov initiated some special conferences on this problem. I should say that Dimitry Fedorovich Ustinov was standing for the ineffective A-35 through thick and thin, but Commander-in-Chief of the AAD general P.F. Batitsky, the head of the main ordering administration G. F. Baydukov and myself believed that the further works on the A-35 must be stopped and the existed should be completely modified. I do remember that Baydukov’s final argument was: «If you will not accept our demand I will take bulldozers and simply level the already built ones!» and finally Ustinov had to incline. At the present time a team of scientists and constructors leading by academic Anatoly Basisty using some of the technologies of A-35 built on principle new and modern system of AMDS which defend Moscow for now. Many believe that it is the USSR which was the main cause of possible war and maybe it’ll sound quite strange for you but I can say with all my responsibility that we had NO real, clear and tested military doctrine, even for possible nuclear war. All the military decisions were made at the sessions of Politbureau having an episodic mean. The problem was also of that kind that Ustinov who had an unbreakable authority in all that concerned military constructions and who became a Minister of Defense of the USSR, didn’t have necessary experience of military command.

- But still in spite of having no clear military doctrine the General Staff and its active were always working on plans of the possible war, weren’t they?

-That’s another question. Such kind of plans exist in every army, and in the US army also. According to their plans, in Europe for example 3 strategic directions were made: the North- Western, the Central and the South- Eastern. We too developed strategic directions but much later. These directions had under command corresponding detachment which were dislocated in the territory of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and border military districts of the European part of the USSR. We should also keep in sight that in the 28- 29th of May 1987 the Political consultative Committee adopted a military doctrine for countries- participants of the Warsaw Treaty which was had strongly defensive mean. Nowadays, press- men acquired access to military archives of countries- participants of the Warsaw Treaty. In this case an article «An Untaken Force- March» by Sergey Gook, which was published in «Isvestiya» February 22, 1992, may puzzle. Development of single tactical- operational exercises may not be taken as preparation for sooner war. There was a law to use nuclear weapons only in return.

- But nevertheless, some definite operational plans existed in the Rocket Forces, didn’t they?

- As far as the Rocket Forces are concerned, it is obvious that there were several variants of how to use them. Mainly against the USA, districts of submarines’ patrol mostly in western and central Atlantic, Mediterranean and Norway seas. In 1972 myself together with the first Vice- Commander- in- Chief of the AAD forces happened to visit one of the submarines of the Northern Fleet. And a captain showed us a special safe for perfocards with programs with variety of missions for the each of 16 nuclear missiles the submarine had. The safe, if necessary, was opened by two keys simultaneously and the perfocards were inserted into computer. But the kind of strike and a permission for it were instructed by Moscow. After that the missile followed the program. It looked like these programs insured a so- called «disarming» strike, when a nuclear missile stroke launching systems and rocket bases of the enemy, and a strike on some civilian objects.

- Are there any lists of these objects?

-Of course there are. In this case I’ll tell you a story. In the early 70th we were asked to predict possible strikes of American Rockets onto the territory of the USSR. Within 2 months scientists led by A .F. Shcheglov, using parameters, characteristics and information of places of dislocation of the USA missiles, were making necessary calculations. At that moment the USA had about 5000 nuclear charges and they were counted to have 10 000 in 1980. So, we predicted the target of every missile. And we also developed possible plans of attacking the USSR and its allies. All these plans were handed to the Minister of Defense- Gretchko and he confirmed them. This data was used in projecting the system of anti- satellite defence.

- Yury Vsevolodovich, could you remember how many of these strikes were for Moscow?

- About sixty. One megaton each.

- As far as I know, as part of preparations for nuclear war the USSR was initiating special works in assuring the security of its centers , underground governmental communications, command centers etc. Did your calculations concern them?

- Naturally. The point is that some modifications of nuclear weapon are to hit not only ground objects but also underground ones. Such missiles before they explode pierce the soil to the depth from 70 to 100 meters. Of course they presented great danger for our underground objects especially for those which had been built in previous time. If such rocket hit one of the subway lines, people would die of a great dynamic strike. So during preparations for nuclear war, as you say, the most important objects were modernized. These installations could resist nuclear strike of any strength. And one more thing I’d like to draw your attention to. At that moment our task was to detect a launch of nuclear missile in any part of the United States, to detect launch from submarines in any part of the World Ocean and to ensure a counter- strike or a strike- in- return before the missiles come down the territory of the USSR. In early 70th we proceed from the information that 1054 American missiles based on 9 bases of the United States of America and their duration of flight to the USSR was approximately 40 minutes. So according to our normative we had about 30 minutes to retaliate. Lately this normative changed greatly and I’ll tell you why. It could be quite natural for Americans that they wanted to hit first without waiting for our retaliation. As far as American, English and French nuclear submarines began patrolling the area close the USSR’s borders, the flight time of the missiles from nuclear submarines to the most vital regions of this country is not more than 15- 20 minutes. One of the variants- to destroy the General Staff and control centers of strategic and ballistic missiles within the shortest time. Just at that moment the Americans decided to place «Pershing-2» missiles on territory of FRG. These «Pershings», became «a gun at the head of Moscow». Their placement began in 1983. In 1982 Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov called a conference on which was called chief of the General Staff N. V. Ogarkov, his first deputy V. P. Varennikov, commander of AA Forces P. Koldunov, first deputy of the Commander-in- chief of the strategic forces Y. A. Yashin, and myself. The agenda of that conference- how to stand against 108 «Pershings». The flight time of «Pershings» to Moscow as we calculated it was 10-12 minutes. Their nuclear warheads were able not only to destroy surface objects but also to penetrate to the depth of 70- 100 meters which of course presented danger for our underground command centers. I remember our submarines were decided to be placed closer to borders of the U.S., and the decision to place medium- range missiles on the territory of GDR and Czechoslovakia was also made. Among other means of resistance to «Pershings» being discussed there, was a necessity to locate launched rockets in 2-3 minutes. At that moment only one station of long- range detection was able to fulfill this kind of task. But its sector of observation was northern and southern parts of FRG. To control the southern part where the Americans planned to place 27 «Pershing- 2», some research centers were projecting tracking complexes. Nevertheless the matter was settled not by scientists but by army men as it happened very often. A few officers led by deputy chief of the station’s technical support, settled and brought in a motion of upgrading the station’s sensors and widening its area of observation up to the southern border of FRG. These tasks were fulfilled within the shortest time and 10 station’s officers were awarded. We had a unique plan of AA Defense. Systems of missile assault warning(SMAW), anti- satellite defense systems etc. were always ready for action. Weapon systems of every «object» had two- and threefold reservation. While set was ready for action, the other was in so- called «warmed- up» mode and the third was in the «cold» mode. Switching between the two modes took less than a second. Of every violation of the process of the working regime was immediately reported to the General Staff and to the Minister of Defense. At that time there was quite a number of debris in the open space such as fragments of rockets, artificial satellites etc. All these objects even the smallest of them are always watched by our control systems, they are constantly identified according to the catalogue of the space objects; we also register launches of new satellites and scraping the old ones. When one of the objects comes close to the trajectory of the rocket, defense systems can easily identify it as a possible target. So, the space control systems warn the missile systems of these false targets beforehand. It’s very significant because for example Americans, due to imperfection of their warning systems, used to register up to fourteen false alarms. They even flew their nuclear bombers and all because of the bird swarm or some stuff which had fallen from the space. The space control center (SCC) was to correctly identify among all this space debris military satellites of the USA and the USSR with their apparatus working. Nevertheless, the Main Staff of the Space Crafts (MSSC) in some cases didn’t announce launch of space crafts and didn’t warn the SCC. And the Americans did the same when launching their most secret satellites.

- Well, as far as we have touched upon the topic of space control, could you tell me how the Soviet Union participated in so- called «star wars». Did military preparations took place there?

- We debated very much on this matter, then the Institutes of Science, military research centers and the General Staff. Generally all these institutes were developing two large projects, following each other: «FON- 1» and «FON- 2». All these research works were controlled by the Ministry of Radio- industry and its Minister Peter Ivanovich Pleshakov. The realization of the program was overseen by the comission for military industry with Leonid Vasiljevich Smirnov at the head. The project «FON- 1» was launched in the late 70th but lately some of the constructors on one of the meetings proposed to stop all works because of lack of perspectives. I stood against such a proposal but the program was soon stopped nevertheless and in 1983 the program «FON- 2» began.

- And what’s the difference between these two programs?

- The program «FON- 1» itself was theoretic research on the subject of «star wars». Different kinds of beam weapons, electromagnetic cannons, antirockets, systems of multiple launch etc. «FON- 2» was closer to practice and was of great need of serious governmental financing. The point is that «FON- 2» was also closely connected with deep research study of alternative means of neutralizing American SDI by means of so- called «unlethal weapons»: by electromagnetic impulse which immediately disrupts electronics, by means of lasers which we develop much faster than the USA. In middle 80th academician Nicolai Dmitrievich Ustinov began working on that problem and approximately at that time we for the first time used our laser cannon in detection mode against the an American shuttle.

- Excuse me, against the piloting spacecraft?

-Exactly so. But it was not «against» it but in order to detect. When Americans began launching their shuttles the General Staff every day had our reports about their flight over the territory of the USSR. So, one I had a call from Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov who asked me: «Why don’t you use our cannon against those shuttles? Have a talk with Nicolai Dmitrievich on this subject.» All right, I call Nicolai Ustinov. «No,- answers he,- I can’t do it now. We have some regulation works. Some other day, maybe.». And so, in a few days the experiment took place. The cannon worked in detection mode with minimum of radiation. According to the report of that shuttle’s crew during their flight over the lake Balhash their communication and some of the apparatus went off- line and the crew itself felt not very good. And the Americans handed in the official protest immediately. Later on laser cannons were not used.

- And there was probably quite a number of such unpleasant events during your active service?

- There were. I remember the spacecraft «KOSMOS- 954» with nuclear mounting on- board having been launched in 1977. Due to alert situation a command was given to «KOSMOS- 954» to enter the orbit of long existence which is a few hundred kilometres higher. But there was a sudden braking on «KOSMOS- 954» and it began quickly descending. As you may see it’s an alert situation because at the time it enter the atmosphere the nuclear mounting will either explode or fall onto the ground and the nuclear contamination. And the MSCC lost the contact with «KOSMOS». So, it was watched and its approximate place of falling was prognosed by the SSC and we did that from December the 20, 1977 to January the 24, 1978. The SCC successfully determined the place of falling of «KOSMOS», it had fallen in solitary mountain district of Canada from where the parts of it were recovered.

- Much polemics has been born today about the discussion of in Russian Parliament the M.A.D. (mutual assured destruction) treaty. What do you think of it?

- This mutual decrease of nuclear weaponry can only be welcomed. The nuclear potency of Russia however can’t be counted as equal to that of the USSR had. With approximate equality in number the USA surpass us in quality and survivalness of nuclear weaponry. We also lose our advantage in number of rockets in launching silos. Upgrading them for placing there mobile rockets is difficult and expensive. The USA also keeps its advantage in sea- based rockets. The USA already have 18 submarines each of them has 24 Trident-class rockets with multiple warheads. And we only have 6 Typhoon- class rocket carriers with 20 rockets on each one. The USA advantages in strategic bombers is also out of question: B- 1, B- 2( Stealth). And we only have old, worn- out TU- 95 of different modifications. Modern TU- 160’s are now all Ukrainian. The President stopped their production for Russia. And with this decrease Great Britain’s and France’s nuclear powers become quite comparable with Russia’s. Another important thing- the treaty doesn’ t touch upon the observance of the treaty of 1972 year about the decrease of AMD systems: the USA didn’t take the statue of Russia and France about using the nuclear weapons only in return. All these things must be closely analyzed by specialists

- As far as I know, the end of your military carrier coincided with the beginning of the so- called «Perestroyka». And now you as a specialist, as a representative of the high Soviet General Staff can value its results. What do you think now when the Soviet Union and with it the united system of defense has fallen? How would you evaluate Russia’s defense nowadays?

- The most terrible blow suffered a missile assault warning system. One of the points of the Soviet- American treaty about the AMD systems says: « national means of missile assault warning are based in border regions with antennas all straight outside». And that’s why all our «national means of warning were situated in Latvia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan. Now they are all independent countries and should we fail to get an agreement from them to counter all these systems of warning as Russian military bases it won’t be good. All these politicians from those new- born countries don’t understand a simple thing: each of the systems can’t operate individually because it scans a limited sector of the world. And the command center of all these is in Russia and all the information comes from antennas keeps there. So, only by means of this command center one can effectively scan the area and warn about the nuclear strike. Of course all these countries can nationalize these systems of warning or which is worse - destroy them. But that means to cut your own throat because their own safety will suffer first of all. Not only Russia but all other ex- republics of the USSR will become practically defenseless. This I announce with all the responsibility. As a specialist, as a former commander of this system of defense. I don’t want to make grim prognoses but if the things remain as they are now, if those stations in spite of the voice of reason are nationalized, if all the upgrading works are stopped and if only, God save us, the Nuclear War outbursts, in its immolative flames only Moscow will be able to protect itself due to its modern system of AMD. And as for all other fraternal republics, they simply won’t even see the rockets which will fall on their sovereign territories.